

The Influenza and the United War Work Campaign

Bulletin XIII
United War Work Campaign
for \$170,500,000
November 11-18, 1918

SERIES OF CAMPAIGN BULLETINS

- I. Organization in the City, Large or Small
- II. Organization in the County
- III. Preparation and Assignment of Lists
- IV. Victory Boys
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
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JOHN R. MOTT

Director General of the United War Work Campaign

In some quarters the question has been raised, Will the Campaign be deferred because of the widespread epidemic of influenza? The General Committee, composed of five leaders of each of the seven organizations which have united for the coming Campaign, have decided, after careful consideration and after wide consultation to adhere to the original date and to conduct the drive as planned, November 11th to 18th. It is recognized that the epidemic constitutes a handicap but the disadvantages of putting off the Campaign outweigh any apparent advantages of such delay. It will be necessary for the leaders and workers everywhere to put forth added energy and to exercise their best judgment and ingenuity in adapting plans to meet the changed conditions. The following considerations and recommendations may be suggestive:

1. The Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign, by far the most stupendous undertaking of its kind in the history of the world, has been carried through to a successful issue in the midst of the same epidemic and also in a time of unsettling peace rumors.

2. The fact that many public meetings are not permitted may not be without its advantages. It leaves people more time to read, to think, and to decide. Time is required to face up to large opportunities and to devise liberal things.

3. More effective use should be made of the printed page to help offset the lack of big meetings. Local publicity committees and campaign workers in general should plan with this definitely in mind. Let them not depend alone or chiefly on national, department, and state headquarters for printed matter, but make larger use of local space and local talent.

4. Study how to effect a great increase in the amount of personal solicitation. Whether there is an epidemic or not, this is the method of securing the largest subscriptions and the largest number of subscribers. This was the secret of rolling up in these recent influenza days the phenomenal list of over 20,000,000 subscribers. It explains the even greater number of subscribers in the Second Red Cross Campaign a few months ago. It is not without its encouragement to remember that the very prevalence of the epidemic means that many people can more readily be found at home than under normal conditions, also that many will have more time to give to personal solicitation.

5. Moreover, because of the handicap occasioned by the epidemic, many a man who had planned to give one third of his time to promoting the Campaign will now be willing to devote two thirds of his time to this patriotic object rather than to see it fail. Men will see that their unselfish and generous cooperation is absolutely essential.

6. While state and municipal health regulations may prevent the holding of mass meetings or public gatherings of any kind, they will not interfere with countless little groups of from two to seven or eight coming together at all hours of day or night to consider the claims of this important national and international object. There is not a town large or small in which influential citizens cannot invite a few men to luncheon or dinner in their homes, or to their offices and there appeal to them for generous subscriptions. Experience shows that these small informal groups yield many of the largest gifts. If the epidemic leads us to rely less on great mass meetings and more on spreading a veritable network of these face-to-face and heart-to-heart conferences of from two to five or ten men each, it will result in larger financial returns than might have been secured under normal conditions.

7. As the people cannot come together on Sundays or other days for religious services, this leaves much valuable time free. Wise planning will result in preempting much of it for the informal little group meetings indicated above, and for very profitable personal solicitation.

8. Much of the time that would ordinarily be spent in working up and attending great meetings may be spent to splendid advantage in thinking out and giving effect to plans to secure large gifts from firms, companies, and corporations. It takes thought to determine the lines along which influence can best be exerted and to bring that influence to bear. One successful solicitation of this kind may be the equivalent of one hundred popular subscriptions secured as the result of a big meeting.

9. Chief thought and effort and the greatest influences should be concentrated on reaching the comparatively small proportion of the people in the community who give by far the largest part in every popular subscription. In a recent campaign in a small city about 13,000 subscribers gave over \$500,000, but ninety-two per cent. of the whole amount came from fewer than 1,300 persons. A study of many canvasses in cities large and small has revealed the fact that fully seven eighths of the money secured came in each case from about one eighth of the subscribers. It might be added that those who subscribe the largest amounts are not, as a rule, reached by public meetings. Nothing in this statement should be construed as minimizing the necessity and importance of securing in every community as large a number as possible of small subscriptions from those who are unable to give more.

10. In some communities where weather conditions are favorable it will be possible to hold meetings in the open air. This plan was frequently employed in the recent Liberty Loan Campaign.

11. In a time like this when so much of the work will have to be done by personal solicitation, larger use than ever should be made of automobiles. Iowa is a rural state and has learned the value of this method. No matter how much the epidemic may spread in that state, the Ford will carry its people over their goal for a large oversubscription.

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1. Because of the remarkable increase of the American Army and of its inevitable continued increase. The budgets of at least three of the seven organizations uniting in the forthcoming Campaign were based on data assembled last spring, when it was thought there would be not more than 1,000,000 American soldiers in France by November first. As a matter of fact, the number there by that date will be 2,000,000. When those budgets were made, moreover, it was thought that the total number of American soldiers on both sides of the Atlantic by next summer would not exceed 3,000,000, whereas our military leaders are now preparing for an American Army, before the end of next summer, of between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000.

2. Because of the marvelous expansion of the American Navy. When America entered the War, we had less than 70,000 men in the Navy. There are now over 600,000 sailors and marines and the number will be further greatly increased. Relatively, the organizations which are uniting in their Campaign have neglected the Navy, but it is their desire to help this arm of the service as much as any other, and therefore a much larger sum of money will be needed for this purpose than is now included in their respective budgets.

3. Because this war, unlike others, is not alone a war of armies and navies, but a war of entire peoples. In particular, it involves vast numbers of the industrial classes. Since our financial plans were announced, the claims of these industrial classes at home and overseas have been pressed upon us, and it has been made clear that we must augment greatly our efforts on behalf of the millions of men and women at work in arsenals, in navy yards, and in countless militarized and other indispensable war industries.

4. Because the burden of this war falls so heavily upon the women of America and of the Allies. They have taken the places of multitudes of men engaged in ordinary occupations and have thus released millions for the fighting forces. They are also largely engaged in making munitions and in other essential war industries. The facts concerning the needs of women affected by war conditions convince us that a much larger financial provision should be made on their behalf than the budgets of our organizations contemplate.

5. Because of the comprehensiveness of the ministry being rendered the American Army and Navy and the forces of our Allies. It is the aim of these agencies to place at the disposal of our soldiers and

sailors all that is best in American life. We represent to them the American home, the American school and college, the American library, the American forum, the best phases of American club life, the finest aspects of the American stage, and above all the American Churches and Synagogues. This is a colossal program and calls for a large expenditure of money—an expenditure necessarily increasing with the growth of the Army and Navy.

6. Because of the continuity of the service we are seeking to render. We aim to follow the soldiers and sailors from the time they leave their homes, while they are in transit, while they are at the training camps, large and small, while they are on their way to the ports of embarkation, as well as at those ports, while they are on the sea, during their stay at the ports of debarkation, during their experiences in further training overseas, in the zone of combat including the front line trenches, while they are at leave resorts or in the hospitals or in the prison camps, and then all the way back to their homes. The volume of expenditure necessarily grows with the steady enlargement of the fighting forces.

7. Because of the imperative need of placing all these helpful facilities at the service of the French Army of 4,000,000, of the Italian Army of 3,000,000, and of the smaller but very important armies of Russia, of Belgium, of Portugal, of Macedonia, of Palestine, of Mesopotamia, and of Egypt. The claims of these Allied Armies were not sufficiently recognized in the framing of our budgets.

8. Because of the indescribable need of the millions of prisoners of war, who must look to us solely for a comprehensive program in the interest of their physical, mental, social, and moral well-being.

9. Even though the War were to end within a few months, or a few weeks, we should stand in great need of a fund of more than \$170,-500,000, because this work, unlike that of many other agencies, will have to be continued throughout the entire period of demobilization. While in Europe, I was told by military authorities that it will require a period of fifteen months from the time that the conflict ceases to transport the Canadian Army to their homes, and that it will call for not less than eighteen months to convey the armies of Australia and New Zealand homeward. Without doubt it will take not less than twelve months to bring our American Army home. During that long period they will have virtually all their time on their hands. They will not have the excitement and the incitement of the war period to stimulate their spirits or its intense activities to absorb their attention and utilize their time. Their temptations will be more numerous and persistent. There will be a tendency to let down standards and relax discipline. It is of the utmost importance that plans be made for the wise use of their leisure hours. The practical and significant question is, Shall our men and boys come back to us weaker or stronger men? The period of demobilization should

not be allowed to become a period of demoralization but rather should be made one of growth in knowledge and working efficiency and of strengthening of character and life purposes. The Young Men's Christian Association and the other organizations are planning not only to enlarge their recreational program during this period, but to launch a great educational campaign. In popular language it may be described as "The University in Khaki." An Army Educational Commission composed of a group of the leading educators of America has been sent overseas. They have asked for two thousand professors and teachers of American colleges and schools to help in launching educational work for the coming winter, and also to be on hand for the period of demobilization, whenever it comes. We have entered into negotiations with the British and French universities to help us in this vast educational undertaking. One may judge of the great dimensions of the enterprise from the fact that it will require at least \$8,000,000 for textbooks and books of reference for the coming winter alone. It ought to be added that no provision is made for this educational program in the budget of \$170,500,000 and therefore in itself this plan affords a further reason why we must have a large oversubscription.

10. If there were no other reason, there should be a large oversubscription in order to meet promptly and effectively emergencies and crises which are sure to come. If you take away from war the unexpected, the surprises, the calamities, the emergencies, the crises, you take away war.